But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider’d, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d and consequently there is no such idea.ģ. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time.

But there is no impression constant and invariable. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. For from what impression cou’d this idea be deriv’d? This question ’tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity and yet ’tis a question, which must necessarily be answer’d, if we wou’d have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible.

Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain’d.

To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence since no proof can be deriv’d from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.Ģ. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. From A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I: Of the understanding, Part IV: Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy Section VI: Of Personal Identity by David Hume.ġ.

David hume's a treatise of human nature